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ASSESSING HUMAN-SYSTEM RESILIENCE POTENTIAL THROUGHOUT THE
DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE *
Amy L. Alexander
MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MIT LL)
Lexington, MA USA
Dan Herschler
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Washington DC, USA
We worked with subject matter experts to create a human-system resilience
checklist that can be utilized during Independent Operational Assessments (IOAs)
of air traffic control systems as part of the system acquisition process. The
checklist focuses on four key areas for evaluating human-system resilience
characteristics: procedures, system use, workload, and training. A resilience
scoring method indicates areas where a human-machine system under
consideration does or does not have resilient characteristics. Overall resilience
scores can be compared among design alternatives, or across different points in
system development for a particular design. The ultimate intent is to provide
guidance and metrics that will enable the FAA to address human-system
resilience aspects in the implementation of NextGen capabilities in the National
Airspace System (NAS). The goal of increased resilience is to reduce the risks
and potential impacts of disruptive events, and to safeguard the efficiency, safety,
and cost effectiveness of NextGen NAS operations.
The Federal Aviation Administration’s NextGen program uses many complex systems
and technologies to increase the efficiency, safety, and cost effectiveness of the National
Airspace System. Although NextGen systems are designed to achieve defined system availability
requirements, system degradation and failure are still a very real, if remote, possibility.
Designing and assessing systems with resilience to failures in mind can reduce the risks or
potential impacts of degradations. Looking to the literature, there are a variety of definitions of
resilience (see Reason, 2000; Sheridan, 2008); however, a number of common characteristics
emerge relating to anticipating adverse effects, withstanding unexpected conditions, maintaining
control, sustaining operations, and recovering quickly when something goes wrong. Resilience is
defined by the FAA as maintaining safety and a minimum level of service in reaction to system
failures or degradations (FAA, 2016). The underlying goal is to prevent or mitigate impacts on
air traffic operations.
Previous work (e.g., Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) has identified characteristics
of resilient organizations and human-machine systems, and initial experimental methods for
assessing resilience potential have been developed. However, these methods primarily apply to
existing or well-prototyped systems. In an effort to assess the resilience potential of an
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operational capability earlier in the system development lifecycle, we worked with subject matter
experts to create a human-system resilience checklist that can be utilized during Independent
Operational Assessments (IOAs) of FAA air traffic control systems as part of the system
acquisition process. The checklist focused on four key areas, identified through collaboration
with subject matter experts in conjunction with review of the resilience literature, that should be
considered when evaluating human-system resilience characteristics: procedures, system use,
workload, and training. A resilience scoring method was developed to provide an indication of
areas where a system under consideration does or does not have resilient characteristics. The
overall resilience score can then be compared to design alternatives, or across different points in
the system development lifecycle for that particular design and operational context. The checklist
and scoring system has yet to be validated, but upcoming IOA testing is anticipated to provide
insight and feedback about the utility of this approach for assessing human-system resilience.
Method
The first step in creating the human-system resilience checklist was to identify resilient
characteristics of NextGen systems, including ways to build, enhance, and assess the resilience
of complex human-machine systems. MIT LL conducted a literature review on characteristics of
resilient systems, particularly focused on human-automation systems (Yenson et al., 2015).
System reliability, system predictability, and operator engagement emerged as three key areas for
examining resilience potential. The identified characteristics of resilient automation systems
were then translated into a list of phrases (e.g., a resilient system is able to handle “unknown
unknown” situations). These phrases formed the basis of a resilience job aid that was originally
developed in reference to the safety risk management (SRM) process, without a specific target
application or end user group. An excerpt from this job aid is presented in Figure 1. The job aid
specifically pointed out questions to ask and actions to take, provided detailed explanations and
rationales, references to SRM documentation, and included a basic scoring method for assessing
resilience potential.
id;i,nco
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Document

Roforo nco

Scori ng

PSP, IIA

4.2.2

O 0: System resilience metrics not
id entified
O 1: System resilience metrics
identified
0 2: System resilience metrics
id entified and conSidered
appropriate

risk.

8.

For this human-machine system, what are
indicators of successful system performance?
Of degraded system perfor mance? Of a fa iled
syst em ? can these indicators be specified by
certain measurable q uahties? Such qualities
an d indical ors can be used in combinatiOns as
indicaton of human-machine syst em resilience~
Do the metrics app ropriat ely meawre ~)'stem
recovery and performance levels after adverse
events?

Rationale: To determine if the system is re:slhent, practttiOners should idenhfy metrics that indicate the system' s
ability t o adapt to, react t o, and learn from abnormal condrtio ns. These metrics can be found by selecting t-•i ents
or o ther ind icators ofd egraded performance, such a.s a hazard ous weather ~ent, and mo nitoring a performancemetric, such as through pu t, ~ fore and after the event t o d etermine-how w ell performance returns after an

.,,.,nl
9.

What are the minimum performance levels for
the resilience metrics? (e.g. < 3 minutes t o

PSP, IIA

4.2.2

D 0 : Baseline metric values not set
D 1: Baseline metric values set

return t o an acceptance rate or 25 aircraft per
minut e after an event}

Rationale: To determine if the syst em i..s resilient, practiUoners need t o set a baseline for the no min al accept able
level of performance for each of the selected re$ilience metrics so that later performance data can be compared
against the required performance.

Figure 1. Original Resilience Job Aid Excerpt
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Various discussions regarding resilience with the FAA led us to the Independent Safety
Assessment Team (AJI-321) of the FAA Air Traffic Organization’s (ATO) Safety and Technical
Training office, which is responsible for conducting independent operational assessments (IOAs)
of designated NextGen systems. IOAs verify new FAA systems or solutions are suitable,
operationally effective, and safe prior to deployment in the NAS. Specifically:
•
•
•

IOAs are independent from the FAA office responsible for deploying the new
system/capability.
IOAs are conducted at operational key sites during live NAS operations.
IOAs are major structured assessments with the purpose of identifying safety hazards
and operational concerns with new systems/capabilities.

AJI-321 agreed for IOA to be a focus area for our work, and we coordinated across seven
working group meetings to review the original resilience job aid and customize it for use during
IOAs. We determined that a more streamlined checklist would be most appropriate for the IOA
context. Working group meetings then focused on carefully reviewing the overall checklist
content, categorizing questions in a meaningful way, and revising the wording of the questions
and their associated responses. Usability and usefulness of the checklist as well as a resilience
scoring system were also discussed as our checklist development progressed.
Checklist
The final checklist contained questions broken down into four key categories for
evaluating human-system resilience characteristics: procedures, system use, workload, and
training. Example questions from each checklist section are presented in Figures 2-5. Questions
were presented with up to four response options, each having a point value associated with it as
well as a color-coded indicator of goodness (red: not indicative of a resilient system, yellow:
resiliency needs improvement; green: indicative of a resilient system). The evaluator was
instructed to select the most appropriate response for each question, and there were comment
fields for any additional notes that would be helpful to capture.
Are detailed and approp riate
proced ures ava ilable fo r a wide
range of situations, including:
a . Syst em usage under
nom ina l conditions?
b.

The most freq uent and/or
critica l known off-n om inal

See sub-question respo nses below :

0 : No

1: Yes, but most
procedures need to be
improved

0 : No

procedures need to be

Assessing system recovery
and performance levels

0 :No

after adverse events?
d.

e.

1: Yes, but most
procedures need to be
improved
1: Yes, but most
procedures need to be
improved

2: Yes, bu t some
procedures need to
be improved
2: Yes, bu t some
proced ures need to
be improved

1: Yes, but most

events?
C.

improved
1: Yes, but most
proce dures need to be
improved

2: Yes, but some
proced ures need to
be improved
2: Yes, bu t some
proced ures need to
be improved
2:. Yes, bu t some
proced ures need to
be improved

Bri nging the system dow n
and back online for
maintenance?

0 : No

Certification of syst ems?

0 : No

Comment s:

Figure 2. Example Procedures Checklist Questions
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3: Yes

3: Yes

3: Yes

I
3: Yes

3: Yes

9.

Does the system notify the
controller if a degradation occurs?

0: No

1: For some
critical

2: For most
critical

functions

functions

1: For some
critical
functions

2: For most
crit ical
functions

3: For all
functions

Comments:

10. Are there design aspects within
the system (e.g., alerts, warni ngs)
that safeguard against controller

0: No

errors and adverse conditions?

3: For all
functions

Comments:

Figure 3. Example System Use Checklist Questions
24. What types of tasks are
performed by the controller
under steady-state (i.e .,
nominal) conditions?
Comments:

0: Tasks involve more
than intended

0: Tasks involve more
active engagement
than intended

2: Tasks are t he
appropriate
passive/active mix

0: Wo rkload is too low
- controller is
disengaged

0: Workload is too
high - controller is
overloaded

2: Workload is
appropriate

passive monitoring

25. Under steady-state conditions,
does the syst em allow for an
appropriate controller workload
level?
Comments:

Figure 4. Example Workload Checklist Questions
33. Which of the following are
provided as part of the
hu man-machine system
t raining protocol?
a.

Minimum training

See sub-question responses below:

1: Yes, but

2: Yes, but

requirements need

requirements need

to be greatly
improved

to be somewhat
improved
2: Yes, but training
needs to be
somewhat
improved
2: Yes, but aids
need to be
somewhat
improved
2: Yes, but training
needs to be
somewhat
improved
2: Yes, but training
needs to be
somewhat
improved

requirements?

0: Not
add ressed

b. Training on system
vulnerabilities?

0: Not
addressed

1: Yes, but t raining
needs to be greatly
improved

0: Not
addressed

1: Yes, but aids need
to be greatly
improved

0: Not
add ressed

1: Yes, but traini ng
needs to be greatly
improved

0: Not
add ressed

1: Yes, but traini ng
needs to be greatly
improved

C.

Operatio nal aids (e.g.,
cheat sheet, help line)
for less-experienced
users?

d . Training sessions on
contingency
procedures?
e. Training sessions on
novel events?

Comments:

Figure 5. Example Training Checklist Questions
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3: Yes,
addressed
adequately
3: Yes,
addressed
adequately
3: Yes,
add ressed
adequately
3: Yes,
add ressed
adequately
3: Yes,
addressed
adequately

Checklist Scoring
A basic scoring system was developed to tally across responses and provide an ordinal
resilence score for each of the four categories. An example resilience scorecard for the
procedures category is presented in Figure 6. Total points possible are broken into three levels to
provide a general assessment of low/moderate/high human-system resilience. Individual category
scores can then be combined to provide an overall human-system resilience score, as shown in
Figure 7.
Procedure Resilience Scorecard
Response
Score

Question
1.

2.
3a.
3b.
4a.
4b.
4c.
4d.
4e.

Max Score Possible
(Benchmark)
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1

5.
6.

1
29

Total

0 - 9: Low Procedure Resilience
10 - 19: Moderate Procedure Resilience

20 - 29: High Procedure Resilience

Figure 6. Procedure Resilience Scorecard

Overall Resilience Scorecard
Category
Score

Category
Procedures
System Use
Workload
Training
Other (Q40J
Total

Max Score Possible
(Benchmark)
29
37
20
47
1
134

0- 44: Low Resilience
45 - 89: Moderate Resi lienee

90 - 134: High Resilience

Figure 7. Overall Resilience Scorecard
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This simple scoring system was developed so as not to imply any unwarranted precision
in quantifying certain responses or categories over others. The notion here is that the checklist
provides an indication of areas where a system under consideration does or does not have
resilient characteristics, and a basis of comparison among design alternatives, or across different
points in system development for a particular design, to determine if the design of a system is
improving over time from a resilience perspective.
Conclusions
In an effort to assess the resilience potential of a system, we worked with subject matter
experts to create a human-system resilience checklist that can be utilized during IOAs of air
traffic control systems as part of the system acquisition process. The checklist and scoring
method presented here have yet to be validated, but application of the revised checklist during
upcoming IOA testing may provide initial validation and feedback about the utility of the
checklist approach for assessing human-system resilience.
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